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INTRODUCTION: THE CRUX OF CONTEMPORARY CATHOLICISM
Recent developments in constitutional and international law
have drawn Catholicism into a formidable controversy. A clash of
values that are pitting legal and political thinkers against each other
on momentous issues has not triggered an unequivocal,
unambiguous response from the Catholic world. Quite the
contrary—a plurality of voices has surfaced. Such voices do not
simply differ but often conflict with each other.
The constitutional changes that are taking place in many
countries are a stress test for Catholic thinking. So-called “populist”
regimes or movements—a vast ideological area3 with uncertain

* The authors conceived the Article and drafted the Introduction and the Conclusion
jointly. Andrea Pin drafted Part 1, while Luca Vanoni drafted Parts 2 and 3. The authors are
grateful to Nicholas Aroney, Frederick M. Gedicks, Joel Harrison, and Dmytro Vovk for their
helpful comments on an earlier draft. Miranda Cherkas Sherrill and McKinney Voss’s editing
was terrific. All errors remain ours.
1. Associate Professor, University of Padua.
2. Associate Professor, State University of Milan.
3. See David Landau, Populist Constitutions, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 521–22 (2018)
(including Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa, Alberto Fujimori,
Evo Morales, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan within his list of populist leaders).
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boundaries,4 often perceived as a constitutional disease5—have
been challenging the priorities and values of liberal democracies,
often trying to replace them with alternative values and
institutional arrangements.6 Catholics are split between liberalism
and populism. Despite wide national variations, Catholics have
been siding either in favor of liberal democracies and their
insistence on the rule of law, human rights, democratic institutions,
and globalization, or in favor of forces that criticize the traditionally
governing elites, perceive constitutional and political agendas as
distant from the concrete needs of the people, and have grown
skeptical of globalization and of liberalism.7 Although few are the
Catholic voices that openly support or endorse populist
movements and regimes, within Catholic culture dwells
widespread criticism of the constitutional canons that liberalism
inspires. Some Catholic intellectuals blame liberalism for
“generat[ing] titanic inequality, enforc[ing] uniformity and
homogeneity, foster[ing] material and spiritual degradation, and
undermin[ing] freedom,”8 so they deem liberalism largely
irreconcilable with Catholicism or with religiosity more broadly.9
The clash between populism and liberalism—to which Pope
Francis’s latest encyclical letter Fratelli Tutti (“All Brothers”) devotes

4. Théo Fournier, From Rhetoric to Action, a Constitutional Analysis of Populism, 20
GERMAN L.J. 362, 363 (2019) (speaking of populism “not as common ideology, but as a
common strategy for implementing various distinct ideologies”).
5. See Rosalind Dixon, Introduction—Public Law and Populism, 20 GERMAN L.J. 125, 125
(2019) (talking about democratic “backsliding,” “retrogression,” “rot,” and “decay”).
6. Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 546 (2018)
(“Around the world, liberal constitutionalism is taking a hit from charismatic leaders . . .
whose signature promise is to not play by the old rules.”).
7. Viktor Orban famously advocated the development of constitutional
“illiberalism” in Hungary. See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, The Opportunism of Populists and the
Defense of Constitutional Liberalism, 20 GERMAN L.J. 314, 321 (2019); see also Bojan Bugaric, The
Two Faces of Populism: Between Authoritarian and Democratic Populism, 20 GERMAN L.J. 390, 391
(2019). Burgaric states that “[p]opulism is Janus-faced; simultaneously facing different
directions. There is not a single form of populism,” but emphasizes that “[w]hat is peculiar
about the current populist surges” is that they often “challenge the very foundations of
liberal order as such.” Id.
8. PATRICK J. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED 3 (2018).
9. Adrian Vermeule, Liturgy of Liberalism, FIRST THINGS (Jan. 2017),
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2017/01/liturgy-of-liberalism. On the ideological
conflict between modern statehood and Christianity, see CHRISTOPHER DAWSON, RELIGION
AND THE MODERN STATE 45–58 (1935).
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an entire section10 has thus drawn Catholicism into a controversy
that is creating deep rifts within it. Each faction has aligned itself
with either the current Pope or his predecessor, as supporters of
Pope Francis often clash with those who miss the leadership of
Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI.11 Such a conflict is particularly
challenging for Catholicism because one of the trademarks of
Catholicism is its strong unity. The Church’s unity is not simply
made visible by the Pope. The Catholic Church has rarely shied
away from speaking its mind on a variety of social issues, ranging
from family12 and sexuality13 to euthanasia14 and Marxism.15 This
has not happened by accident: Catholic social teaching is a key
component of Catholicism, as Catholicism is quintessentially
concerned with social well-being and flourishing.16 In the Second
Vatican Council Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes’s words,
“[a]t all times and in all places the [Catholic] Church should have
true freedom . . . to proclaim her teaching about society, to carry out
her task among men without hindrance, and to pass moral
judgements even in matters relating to politics, whenever the
fundamental rights of man or the salvation of souls requires it.”17
This is not a privilege that the Catholic Church claims for itself; in
fact, “[i]t is her duty to give utterance to, and authoritatively to
teach, that truth which is Christ Himself, and also to declare and
10. See POPE FRANCIS, ENCYCLICAL LETTER: FRATELLI TUTTI paras. 155–69 (2020),
http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papafrancesco_20201003_enciclica-fratelli-tutti.html.
11. Paul Elie, “The Two Popes” Gives Way to Pope vs. Pope on the Issue of Celibacy in the
Priesthood, NEW YORKER (Feb. 2, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/dailycomment/the-two-popes-gives-way-to-pope-vs-pope-on-the-issue-of-celibacy-in-thepriesthood (“The conflict between progressives and traditionalists has hardened around the
two Popes.”).
12. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
paras.
2201–06
(1993),
https://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM.
13. Id. paras. 2360–63.
14. Id. para. 2276.
15. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER: CENTESIMUS ANNUS para. 19 (1991)
[hereinafter
POPE
JOHN
PAUL
II,
CENTESIMUS
ANNUS],
http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jpii_enc_01051991_centesimus-annus.html.
16. HENRI DE LUBAC, CATTOLICISMO XXIII (1978, Italian edition).
17. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ADDRESS OF THE HOLY FATHER TO THE NEW AMBASSADOR OF
MEXICO TO THE HOLY SEE para. 4 (May 18, 2001), http://www.vatican.va/content/johnpaul-ii/en/speeches/2001/may/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20010519_ambassadormexico.html (citing POPE PAUL VI, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN
WORLD: GAUDIUM ET SPES para. 76 (1965)); see also NORMAN DOE, COMPARATIVE RELIGIOUS
LAW 372 (2018).
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confirm by her authority those principles of the moral order which
have their origins in human nature itself.”18
This Article does not aim to draw a line between what is inside
and outside the boundaries of Catholic doctrine, nor does it mean
to take a stance on who is right or wrong within the Church. It also
intentionally avoids guessing whether populist leaders give fresh
political shape to genuine protest movements or rather cynically
exploit social unrest, dressing it in ideological robes for purely selfinterested goals.19 This Article’s purpose is more modest. It simply
aims to sketch out why and how such contemporary ideological
rifts have created distance between groups of Catholics.
Notwithstanding the fierce, even hostile, confrontations that now
inhabit Catholic circles, this Article submits that Catholics disagree
about populism and liberalism because many aspects of both
resonate with aspects of Catholicism and its mainstream doctrines.
Instead of triggering hostilities, disagreements among Catholics on
core societal values could and should therefore be replaced by a
gentler, more respectful conversation among factions that mutually
recognize each other as worthy of respect and consideration. They
could take Pope Francis’s recent offer to engage in a “genuine
dialogue and openness to others”20—starting with those who share
their Catholic faith.
This Article identifies three fields where tensions are pulling
Catholicism’s social thinking in opposite directions: first, the
relationship between democracy, freedom, the market, and rights;
second, the role of identity and tradition; and third, the separation
of powers and the importance of constitutional interpretation. It
analyzes each topic in light of contemporary legal discourse,
discusses how and why Catholics are leaning toward either side,
and suggests that many conflicts within Catholicism may become
lively conversations that draw upon essential features of Catholic
culture. As it focuses on the contemporary confrontations between
supporters of liberalism and populism, it does not explicitly deal
with longstanding debates around the theoretical compatibility
between liberalism and Catholicism and their complex historical
18. POPE PAUL VI, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: DIGNITATIS HUMANAE para.
14 (1965), http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/
vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html.
19. Gabor Halmai, Populism, Authoritarianism and Constitutionalism, 20 GERMAN L.J.
296, 300 (2019).
20. POPE FRANCIS, supra note 10, para. 203.
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relationships.21 An inherited degree of mutual skepticism between
Catholic and liberal thinkers may have pushed Catholics closer to
populism—but this Article argues that it is mostly contemporary
legal, political, and cultural issues that have widened the gaps
between Catholics and liberalism. The authors will consider it a
success if they are able to reinvigorate the consciousness that, as the
great Protestant thinker Richard Niebuhr once noted, “the types of
Christian morality are not measures of value.”22
I. DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM: MEANS AND ENDS
Contemporary Catholicism has often valued the benefits of
modern constitutionalism. Appreciation of the rule of law,
democracy, and human rights abounds within papal documents.23
Since the late nineteenth century’s Syllabus of Errors and its
condemnation of liberalism, a sea-change has taken place within
Catholic doctrine.24 After opposing gross human rights violations
by the Nazis in the first half of the twentieth century, the Catholic
Church became a vocal supporter of liberty, equality, and human
dignity.25 Since the 1940s, it has endorsed the human rights
revolution and the democratization of the world both at national
and international levels.26 For most of the nineteenth century,
Catholics in the United States, who had already been exposed to the
ideals of liberal constitutionalism, struggled initially to find their
place alongside Protestants but later came to enjoy the blessings of
the American constitutional experiment by urging their coreligionaries to reconsider liberalism.27
Catholicism promoted the values of democracy and liberty
throughout the Iron Curtain era. It was John Paul II’s explicit
criticism of the regime in Poland that boosted the collapse of
communism in Eastern Europe.28 The Berlin Wall’s Fall Zeitgeist,

21. See, e.g., SAMUEL MOYN, CHRISTIAN HUMAN RIGHTS 3–4 (2015).
22. H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, CHRIST & CULTURE, at iv (2001).
23. See generally POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 15, para. 44.
24. J. Bryan Hehir, The Modern Catholic Church and Human Rights: The Impact of the
Second Vatican Council, in CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION 113–14
(John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2010).
25. On the relationship between Christian and liberal conceptions of human dignity,
see Nicholas Aroney, The Rise and Fall of Human Dignity, 46 BYU L. REV. 1211 (2021).
26. MOYN, supra note 21.
27. JOHN C. MURRAY, THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 51–52 (1965).
28. MASSIMO BORGHESI, CRITICA DELLA TEOLOGIA POLITICA 256 (2013).
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however, probably overlooked important nuances. Captured by
the fall of communism, the prevailing political and legal thinking
of the time misunderstood the historical victory of Western
freedoms and papal support for a perpetual marriage between
Catholicism and liberalism.29
Within a few years after the Wall fell, this misunderstanding
became apparent. Catholic thinkers and movements started
warning that democracy and human rights had more than just a
bright side. A much broader skepticism about the reputation of
liberalism and liberal democracies has more recently surfaced
within Catholic circles.30 The connections that tied together the
Catholic Church and the supporters of post-modern liberal
constitutionalism seem to have softened, if not dissipated. Catholic
thinkers have started questioning liberal values and institutions,
targeting liberal economies and liberalism altogether.
A.

The Perils of Liberal Economies

Understandably, the staunch and even vocal Catholic resistance
to communist regimes joined forces with supporters of capitalism
during the Cold War. While Catholicism targeted the communist
thinking that cracked down on religious freedom31 and “reduced
man to matter,”32 economic liberalism targeted the state monopoly

29. For a synthesis of the role of the Church in the transition between the communist
regime and liberal democracy in Poland, see Jacqueline Hayden, Solidarity at 40: How the
Union that Brought Down Communism Became a Conservative Government Ally, NOTES FROM
POLAND (Aug. 28, 2020), https://notesfrompoland.com/2020/08/28/solidarity-at-40-howthe-union-that-brought-down-communism-became-a-conservative-government-ally/.
30. See Frederick M. Gedicks, Dignity and the Overlapping Consensus, 46 BYU L. REV.
1245, 1265–66 (2021).
The refusal of conservative Christians to accept some applications of equal rights
and equal dignity is not simply the consequence of group self-interest.
Conservative Christian religions—especially Catholicism—adhere to one
conception of the good; they claim that the truth about God and his creation is
accessible to all through the exercise of natural reason. Laws, institutions, and
other government actions that do not conform to the natural law are unjust and
deficient . . . .
Id.
31. POPE PIUS XI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER: DIVINI REDEMPTORIS para. 10 (1937),
http://www.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_pxi_enc_19370319_divini-redemptoris.html.
32. MOYN, supra note 21, at 38.
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over national economies.33 An alliance between liberalism and
Catholicism seemed to provide the “moral-cultural base” or “moral
ecology . . . that undergirds, sustains, and guides economic and
democratic freedom[s].”34
After the collapse of communism in Europe, the two intellectual
strands went hand in hand, driving the expansion of market
freedoms in Eastern Europe and, later, the strengthening and
enlargement of European legal integration. In the 1990s, many
countries of the Eastern Bloc, including some post-Soviet republics,
applied to join the European Communities, which transitioned into
the European Union soon thereafter.35
The economic theories of the European Communities and of the
European Union between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s supported
this process of integration. The free market was, in fact, an
overarching theme of the pan-European political and legal
integration process, which the Catholic Church welcomed.36
Economic freedoms had already played a crucial role in replacing
national rivalries, industrial dumping, and retaliatory customs
policies with open borders for people, goods, and companies in the
1950s and 1960s in Western Europe, and these freedoms could
reasonably be expected to do the same within Eastern Europe. This
was not the same economic philosophy espoused by the United
States, but it was certainly much closer than the alternative of
highly nationalized or state-controlled economies.
The alliance between Catholicism and European integration,
including its economic policies, lasted until the global financial
crisis in 2008. Ties between the European Union, Catholicism, and
liberalism faded away, as evidenced by the shift in winners of the
Charlemagne Prize. Since 1950, this award has honored the
protagonists of European unification under the auspices of pan-

33. Nowadays, this approach is still particularly evident within various intellectual
circles. See, e.g., Peter Berkowitx, Capitalism, Socialism, and Freedom, HOOVER INST. (Feb. 2020),
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/prosperityproject_
peterberkowitz_updated.pdf.
34. R.R. Reno, The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism, FIRST THINGS (Oct. 2017),
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2017/10/the-spirit-of-democratic-capitalism (citing
Michael Novak, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM (1982)).
35. PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW 14–28, 582 (5th ed. 2011).
36. As to the historical link between Catholicism, the leading Christian Democratic
parties that governed much of post-World War II Western Europe, and European legal
integration, see BRENT F. NELSEN & JAMES L. GUTH, RELIGION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
EUROPEAN UNION 182 (2015).
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European institutions,37 including Adenauer, De Gasperi,
Schuman, and George Marshall. In 2002, the prize went to the
newborn euro currency, which had reinforced the budgetary
constraints on E.U. member states; in 2004, an extraordinary edition
of the award was given to Pope John Paul II; Angela Merkel was
awarded the prize in 2008. In 2012, the winner was the German
Minister of Finance, Wolfgang Schaeuble, who had supported
austerity measures within E.U. countries to counter the economic
crisis that exploded in 2008. The year Schaeuble won the prize,
however, the crisis hit hard on many European countries and
caused the tides to turn.
During the crisis, many European countries could not fight the
collapse of their economies because of the Eurozone’s strong fiscal
constraints, which forced them to embark on austerity measures
while securing free markets. Vast portions of European society
discovered that, by supporting measures to protect the common
market and secure the value of the currency that they had warmly
welcomed a little more than a decade before, they had tied their
hands: many states could not fight the economic depression
effectively because of their commitment to protecting the euro and
to avoiding unsettling markets.38 Pope Francis himself, who won
the 2016 edition of the Charlemagne Prize, voiced his strong
concerns for the flaws of globalized economy and for the price that
people in Europe and elsewhere paid for them.39
The crisis destroyed the belief that globalization and economic
freedom would secure prosperity, or even a decent life. At first, the
economic collapse showed that globalization, the free market, and
deregulation had not insulated modern states from deep financial
and social crises.40 Or, in the words of Pope Francis in his encyclical
letter Fratelli Tutti, “[t]he marketplace, by itself, cannot resolve

37. Origin,
DER
INTERNATIONALE
KARLSPREIS
ZU
AACHEN,
https://www.karlspreis.de/en/charlemagne-prize/origin (last visited Feb. 9, 2021).
38. See generally KLAUS BUSCH, CHRISTOPH HERMANN, KARL HINRICHS & THORSTEN
SCHULTEN, FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG, EURO CRISIS, AUSTERITY POLICY AND THE EUROPEAN
SOCIAL MODEL: HOW CRISIS POLICIES IN SOUTHERN EUROPE THREATEN THE EU’S SOCIAL
DIMENSION (2013), https://www.europe-solidarity.eu/documents/ES_crisis.pdf.
39. For a deeper discussion of Pope Francis’s economic and social views, see ANDREA
TORNIELLI & GIACOMO GALEAZZI, THIS ECONOMY KILLS: POPE FRANCIS ON CAPITALISM AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE (2015).
40. Andrea Pin, The Transnational Drivers of Populist Backlash: The Role of Courts, 20
GERMAN L.J. 225, 238–39 (2019).
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every problem.”41 Later, the austerity policies that the European
Union and its members favored or implemented showed that such
ideals could even constitute an obstacle to the states’ capacity to
provide adequate social protection and strengthen economic safety
nets in times of distress.42 European society split into those who, on
one side, acknowledged the harm inflicted by austerity, but
justified it as a necessary treatment to resurrect the economy
and restore social welfare, and those on the other side who
believed that such measures were simply a bad solution, which
deprioritized social care, economic stability, and welfare in the
name of economic liberalism.43
Especially in Europe, Catholics were involved in such clashes.
Within the Catholic camp, authoritative speakers such as Caritas
Europa, the continental network of Catholic relief and development
agencies, voiced their concern that austerity was overlooking the
basic needs of the poor.44 Overall, the European Union’s response
to the global economic crisis abrogated the decades-long Catholic
support of European integration, thereby paving the way for antisupranational, nation-focused political platforms that embraced
populist movements among Catholics.45
B.

The Quagmire of Rights

While liberalism and Catholicism joined forces under the Iron
Curtain to fight communism, they never merged with each other.
Among Catholic thinkers has always dwelled the perception that
liberalism and the doctrine of the Catholic Church may overlap
substantially but do not coincide. For decades, this was mostly a
matter for philosophers and theologians,46 but now it has become a
hotly debated political and legal topic. Two factors have brought to
light the deep rifts between Catholic and liberal thinkers, namely
41. POPE FRANCIS, supra note 10, para. 168.
42. Jan C. Suntrup, From Emergency Politics to Authoritarian Constitutionalism? The Legal
and Political Costs of EU Financial Crisis Management, 19 GERMAN L.J. 375, 400 (2018).
43. Andrea Pin, Comparative Constitutional Law, Human Rights, and Belonging
in Europe, RESET DIALOGUES ON CIVILIZATIONS (June 5, 2020), https://www.resetdoc.org/
story/comparative-constitutional-law-rights-and-belonging-in-europe/.
44. Caritas: European Austerity Measures Threaten Social Services, CATH. CULTURE (Dec.
21, 2011), https://www.catholicculture.org/news/headlines/index.cfm?storyid=12747.
45. Daphne Halikiopoulou, Economic Crisis, Poor Governance and the Rise of Populism:
The Case of Greece, 55 INTERECONOMICS 34 (2020).
46. Brian Tierney, Villey, Ockham and the Origin of Individual Rights, in THE WEIGHTIER
MATTERS OF THE LAW 1 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank Alexander eds., 1988).
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the rise of a human rights-based lingua franca and the post-9/11
multilateral intervention in the Middle East.
1. Human rights as a lingua franca
The alliance between Catholicism and the human rights
revolution in the second half of the twentieth century was strongly
substantiated by universalism. In Catholic thought, universalism is
based on the idea that all human beings share a common
ontological nature because they were all created by God.47 This
belief has resonated with theories of human rights that have
chartered a new course in the field of international law.48 Despite
this historical common ground, liberalism and Catholicism have
recently started to significantly diverge from one another on
practical matters. In fact, although both place the human being at
the center of their legal and political theories, they have
increasingly disagreed on the substance of this idea. Two issues, in
particular, make up this disagreement.
First, Catholic thinking found that the process of secularization
promoted by liberalism worldwide was pushing the spiritual and
religious component of individual and social life to the margins.49
The rights-centered edifice of liberal constitutionalism has thus
become a rival, rather than a partner of religion, as it has gradually
replaced transcendental values with nonreligious values.50
Catholics, alongside other religious groups, have thus come to
perceive that their faith was being walled out of the public sphere
and that they were becoming socially and politically irrelevant.
Although in different guises, the French theorization of a secular
47. As the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (432) states, “The Christian
message offers a universal vision of the life of men and peoples on earth that makes us realize
the unity of the human family.” PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, COMPENDIUM
OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH (2004) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM],
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_
justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2021).
48. Paolo G. Carozza & Daniel Philpott, The Catholic Church, Human Rights, and
Democracy: Convergence and Conflict with the Modern State, 15 LOGOS: J. CATH. THOUGHT &
CULTURE 15 (2012).
49. John Paul II warned the international community of states not to prioritize the
“[m]aterial goods” over the “spiritual goods.” See Hehir, supra note 24, at 127.
50. JAVIER PRADES, NOSTALGIA DI RESURREZIONE 13 (2007) (“[A]ssistiamo a un
fenomeno linguistico, sociale e, ormai, anche giuridico, secondo cui la vita, in tutte le sue
dimensioni, smette di essere considerata dono per essere invece rivendicata come diritto . . .
vorrei richiamare l’attenzione sulla tendenza a trasformare ogni possibilità umana in diritto
e a eliminarne, in maniera direttamente proporzionale, il carattere di dono.”).
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public sphere and the U.S.-led frenzy for a “naked public square”51
were perceived as depriving social and political life of the richness
of the Catholic tradition.
Second, Catholicism could not follow what many have
perceived to be a utilitarian turn within liberalism. To some,
secularism has made liberalism not just flat but even self-centered.
In their view, contemporary liberalism’s utmost concern is for “the
satisfaction of current wants or preferences without worrying
much about the formation of those wants and preferences.”52 Such
hedonistic degeneration of liberalism, they argue, has loosened
social bonds, disconnected freedom from pursuing good, and
legitimized any way of life regardless of its goals.
The late twentieth century’s human rights scenario has thus
triggered widespread skepticism within Catholicism. As Mary Ann
Glendon emphasized almost thirty years ago, “rights talk” has
taken center stage, making individualism the core legal value, and
individualist legal claims the main driver of legal change.53 The
idea of fundamental or human rights has celebrated the role of the
individual and her isolation from the rest of society. Catholic circles
complain that, instead of building bridges between individuals,
enabling minorities to fully participate in the public sphere, and
insulating them from government overreach, a rights-centered
legal discourse has broken the ties between the individual and the
polity.54 It has impoverished political discourse, transforming it
into the terrain of reciprocal individual claims.55 In essence,
Catholic circles argue that the rights-centered legal discourse has
monopolized politics and hollowed out democratic debate. It has
substantially limited room for governmental policies. It has
exacerbated social rifts rather than reconciling them.

51. RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA (1986).
52. LARRY SIEDENTOP, INVENTING THE INDIVIDUAL: THE ORIGINS OF WESTERN
LIBERALISM 363 (2014) (arguing that the failure to understand the relationship between liberal
secularism and Christianity contributes to two temptations or liberal heresies: utilitarianism
and individualism).
53. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991).
54. DENEEN, supra note 8, at 30–31.
55. Pope Francis, in Fratelli Tutti, complains about the contemporary “complete
division between individuals and human community.” See POPE FRANCIS, supra note 10,
para. 31.
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Catholic culture usually sees such logic at play within most of
the rights it considers controversial; euthanasia, birth control, and
same-sex partnerships and marriage have found their roots in the
ideals of self-realization, privacy, and freedom.56 Since liberalism
seems to have bred these rights and the constitutional engines
within which they thrive, many Catholics have come to blame
liberalism and its ideals of privacy and freedom. When Catholics
endorsed liberalism, they did not embrace self-centered
individualism. On the contrary, they maintained that full
realization of human potential was conceivable only with reference
to an objective good, and that the whole polity had a role to play in
identifying it.57 In other words, many have complained that
liberalism’s understanding of liberty betrays its own nature, as well
as the promises of democracy.58
Some Catholic factions have thus grown so skeptical of the
ideals of liberty, privacy, and self-realization, that they have leaned
toward populist movements as a political antidote to liberalism.
They have come to consider the contemporary ideals of freedom
and individualism so antithetical to Catholic culture, its social
dimension, and the role of democratically elected bodies, that they
have gone the other way. Viktor Orban, the Hungarian Prime
Minister, has deemed Hungary an exemplary “illiberal”
democracy.59 This moniker might be perceived as an oxymoron, but
it resonates with the feelings of those who oppose too sweeping an
understanding of freedom—one that dissolves social and political
bonds into a mass of self-isolated individuals.
2. The freedoms of the Middle East
The marriage between Western liberalism and Catholicism also
eroded during the events that shook the Middle East in the
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The coalition that toppled the regime
56. JOHN PAUL II, MEMORIA E IDENTITÀ 22–23 (2005).
57. As noticed by Joel Harrison, Christian Accounts of Religious Liberty: Two Views of
Conscience, 46 BYU L. REV. 1273, 1297 (2021), “[o]n the inter-subjective view of conscience,
still present in Christian religious liberty discourse, the person has a duty to pursue God as
one’s own end. This entailed forming a community—conscience was not simply an act of the
individual, but it was directed to social ends. Conscience, in other words, is exercised in aid
of a flourishing community.”
58. DENEEN, supra note 8, at 65–66.
59. Csaba Tóth, Full Text of Viktor Orbán’s Speech at Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádfürdő) of 26 July
2014, BUDAPEST BEACON (July 29, 2014), https://budapestbeacon.com/full-text-of-viktororbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/.
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of Saddam Hussein in Iraq was a matter of deep controversy, even
within Catholicism. The U.S. and U.K.-led coalition was hoping to
replace the rogue state with a stable and just democratic regime,
one in which all citizens would enjoy the same rights, be subject to
the same duties, and participate in free, competitive elections.60
Alongside the Bush and Blair administrations were towering
Catholics figures, who forecasted that a just war would succeed in
exporting these conditions for a dignified, free Iraq. Among these
thinkers were people such as John Neuhaus, the founder of the
influential First Things magazine;61 John Paul II’s biographer and
theologian, George Weigel;62 and Michael Novak,63 a Catholic
philosopher who had successfully merged Catholic ideals with the
fundamentals of American liberalism. They each strongly
advocated the military intervention as a necessary means to achieve
indispensable goals, borrowing from Catholic doctrine to support
their position.64
The hierarchy of the Catholic Church, however, largely
opposed the war.65 The justification for a military intervention was
fragile from an international law perspective. While military
intervention in Afghanistan took place under the umbrella of the
United Nations,66 the Iraqi campaign lacked a similar basis.67

60. George W. Bush, President Outlines Steps to Help Iraq Achieve Democracy and
Freedom,
THE
WHITE
HOUSE
(May
24,
2004),
https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/05/20040524-10.html.
61. BORGHESI, supra note 28, at 267.
62. George Weigel, Moral Clarity in a Time of War, FIRST THINGS (Jan. 2003),
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2003/01/001-moral-clarity-in-a-time-of-war.
63. Michael Novak, Was the War in Iraq Just?, 9 NEXUS 11–15 (2004).
64. Richard J. Neuhaus, The Sounds of Religion in a Time of War, FIRST THINGS (May
2003), https://www.firstthings.com/article/2003/05/the-sounds-of-religion-in-a-time-ofwar; see Peter Dula, The War in Iraq: How Catholic Conservatives Got It Wrong, COMMONWEAL
MAG. (Nov. 30, 2004), https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/war-iraq.
65. Gerard O’Connel, Quando Bush Gnorò la Lettera di Wojtila Contro la
Guerra Irachena, VATICAN INSIDER (July 10, 2019), https://www.lastampa.it/vaticaninsider/it/2011/09/27/news/quando-bush-ignoro-la-lettera-di-wojtyla-contro-la-guerrairachena-1.36932734.
66. U.N. SCOR, 4443rd mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/1386 (Dec. 20, 2001),
https://undocs.org/S/RES/1386(2001).
67. Ewen MacAskill & Julian Borger, Iraq War Was Illegal and Breached UN
Charter, Says Annan, GUARDIAN (Sept. 15, 2004), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2004/sep/16/iraq.iraq.

1313

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

46:5 (2021)

However, John Paul II,68 as well as other Catholic institutions and
U.S. Catholic bishops,69 did warn against the Iraqi intervention on
other grounds. The conditions of a just war, they argued, were not
met and the campaign was more likely to bring anarchy and chaos
rather than democracy and freedom.70 Many Catholic circles
believed that the ideals of liberalism and democracy would not
have the success that supporters of the intervention expected, and
that the fall of Saddam Hussein would expose Christian minorities
to more violence than they had experienced under his regime.71
Regardless of the final outcome of the Iraqi invasion, the intraCatholic debate on that occasion showed that within Catholicism
dwelled various beliefs about the exportability of liberty, the
hierarchy of legal values, and the very idea of a military mission
with a strong moral character aimed at uplifting the legal and civic
standards of another country.72 Catholic circles disagreed on how
to prioritize peace, social stability, democracy, and the enjoyment
of freedoms. Overall, the Church indicated ambivalence toward
liberalism. As a philosophy that urged political leaders and public
opinion to protect and promote basic freedoms, it was certainly
welcomed. It was not the paramount ideal, however, that stood
above any other consideration, nor was it the yardstick against
which international relations had to be measured.73 In the eyes of
staunch promoters of liberalism, the Catholic Church became a
lukewarm supporter of this idea, quick to abandon it when it was
prone to generate controversy.

68. Frank Bruni, Threats and Responses: The Vatican; Pope Voices Opposition, His
Strongest, to Iraq War, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/
2003/01/14/world/threats-responses-vatican-pope-voices-opposition-his-strongest-iraqwar.html.
69. Paul Moses, Vatican Diplomacy & the Iraq War, COMMONWEAL MAG. (Jan. 13, 2020),
https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/vatican-diplomacy-iraq-war.
70. BORGHESI, supra note 28, at 267.
71. John Dear, The Catholic Campaign to End Iraqi War, NAT’L CATH. REP. (Aug. 21,
2007), https://www.ncronline.org/blogs/road-peace/catholic-campaign-end-iraq-war.
72. See WALTER A. MCDOUGALL, THE TRAGEDY OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 270–75 (2016).
73. Catholic disapproval of George W. Bush’s decision to topple Saddam Hussein in
the name of the imperative to “free the world from evil” was later reiterated in Antonio
Spadaro & Marcelo Figueroa, Evangelical Fundamentalism and Catholic Integralism: A
Surprising
Ecumenism,
LA
CIVILTÀ
CATTOLICA
(July
13,
2017),
https://www.laciviltacattolica.it/articolo/evangelical-fundamentalism-and-catholicintegralism-in-the-usa-a-surprising-ecumenism/.
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II. POLITIES, TRADITIONS, AND IDENTITIES
The spatial dimension of legal regimes has also generated
controversy between Catholicism and liberalism. While Catholic
thinking has constantly maintained that all human beings,
regardless of time and place, are endowed with certain unalienable
rights, it has also valued the distinct traditions that all peoples have
developed throughout their history. Or, in the great theologian
Henri De Lubac’s words, “civilizations, as original as people are,
are irreducibly different.”74
The universal vocation of the Church and its global reach
resonates strongly with globalization. As its jurisdiction covers the
whole earth, its concern for human beings and for their dignity is
also universal. The local dimension of the Church, however, values
the distinct features of any national, subnational, or cultural
variation. The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church
celebrates the centrality of “a true international community”75 and
the importance of “international law” as “the guarantor of the
international order,” while warning about the risk of “relativizing
or destroying the different and distinctive characteristics of each
people.”76 More recently, Pope Francis’s encyclical letter Fratelli
Tutti defends each country’s “distinct way” to grow and “to
develop its capacity for innovation while respecting the values of
its proper culture.”77 The Catholic Church has constantly cherished
local customs and groups as irreplaceable developers of individual
and collective identities as well as of freedoms. Along with other
voices that tried to balance universalism and particularism
especially after the Second World War,78 the Catholic Church has
therefore urged balance between the opposing poles of universality

74. DE LUBAC, supra note 16, at 221.
75. COMPENDIUM, supra note 47, § 433.
76. Id. § 434.
77. POPE FRANCIS, supra note 10, para. 51.
78. As Eleanor Roosevelt argued when working on the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, “universal human rights begin . . . [i]n small places close to home—so close
and so small that they cannot be seen on any map of the world,” and “[u]nless these rights
have meaning there, they have little meaning everywhere.” Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as
a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 38 (2003).
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and particularity, rather than trying to put them into a
hierarchical order.79
Balancing universality and particularity has not been easy for
the Church itself.80 It has become especially difficult recently
because of the rise of cosmopolitanism and sovereignism, which
have exacerbated tensions within Catholicism.81 As Ulrich Beck
emphasized, cosmopolitanism developed as a distinct
“methodological concept which helps to overcome methodological
nationalism and to build a frame of reference to analyze the new
social conflicts, dynamics and structures of Second Modernity.”82
Cosmopolitanism, however, has promoted a cultural mindset that
sees the world as a flat plane, on which individuals and ideas
should be capable of moving freely.83 Within this intellectual
framework, local traditions, laws, and customs are often perceived
as obstacles to social mobility and cultural amalgamation. Pierre
Manent has summarized the cosmopolitanism extreme as follows:
“[T]he only humanly significant realities, the only ones which are
entitled to incontestable rights, are the individual on the one hand
and humanity on the other; between these two, strictly speaking,
there is nothing of worth.”84 Cosmopolitanism has thus affected the
delicate balance between universalism and particularism,
prioritizing the former over the latter.

79. As noted by Carozza, the principle of subsidiarity offered “a conceptual tool to
mediate the polarity of pluralism and the common good in a globalized world.” Id. It
underscored and legitimized the “inherent tension in international human rights law
between affirming a universal substantive vision of human dignity and respecting the
diversity and freedom of human cultures.” Id.
80. As for Europe, see Olivier Roy, Populism and Christianity: The Tale of Two Continents,
BERKLEY CTR. FOR RELIGION, PEACE & WORLD AFFS.: GEO. U. (Dec. 18, 2019),
https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/populism-and-christianity-the-tale-oftwo-continents (“[T]he Catholic Church has a problem to find a way to reconcile its claim for
universality with its sentimental attachment to the same ‘Christian identity’ of Europe.”).
81. Cosmopolitanism in itself is an ancient political idea, which originated in ancient
Greece and survived the ages in philosophical literature. For a recent consideration on the
historical relationships between cosmopolitanism and Christianity, see Nicholas Aroney,
Christianity, Sovereignty, and Global Law, in CHRISTIANITY AND GLOBAL LAW (Rafael Domingo
& John Witte, Jr. eds., 2020).
82. Ulrich Beck, The Cosmopolitan Society and Its Enemies, 19 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y
17, 18 (2002).
83. See Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1022, 1025 (2007).
84. Pierre Manent, Populist Demagogy and the Fanaticism of the Center,
J. AM. AFFS. (2017), https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2017/05/populist-demagogy-andthe-fanaticism-of-the-center/.
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The history and the present status of European integration
provide good examples of how universalism morphed into
cosmopolitanism. The project of integrating Western European
countries into a bigger legal framework was born out of the will of
Catholic political leaders such as Robert Schuman, Konrad
Adenauer, and Alcide de Gasperi. They thought that supranational
institutions would restore peace and prosperity on the Continent,
as well as create a new European polity, deeply rooted in Christian
teachings.85 It is no surprise, then, that Catholics overwhelmingly
favored European integration in its early decades, especially in
comparison with Protestants.86
The pan-European project fleshed out the Catholic ideals of
universalism and its commitment to the unity of the human family
within the Old Continent, gaining the papal support of Saint John
Paul II, who celebrated the alliance between Christianity and
European integration more than once.87
While praising the integration process, however, John Paul II
qualified his judgment. Addressing the European Parliament in
1998, he shared his vision of
[a] common political structure, the product of the free will of
European citizens . . . able to guarantee more equitably the rights,
in particular the cultural rights, of all its regions. These united
European peoples will not accept the domination of one nation or
culture over the others, but they will uphold the equal right of all
to enrich others with their difference.88

In Ecclesia in Europa (The Church in Europe), the exhortation
that he delivered in 2003 after a Synod of Bishops that focused on

85. See Rosario Forlenza, The Politics of the Abendland: Christian Democracy and the Idea
of Europe after the Second World War, 26 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 261 (2017).
86. Brent F. Nelsen & James L. Guth, Losing Faith: Religion and Attitudes Toward the
European Union in Uncertain Times, 58 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 909, 909 (2020) (“Surveys dating
back to 1970 have demonstrated that, controlling for all other factors, Catholics favor
integration, while Protestants express far less support for the EU.”).
87. See Pope John Paul II, Address During the Visit to the European Parliament paras.
3–4 (Oct. 11, 1988) [hereinafter Pope John Paul II, Address to European Parliament],
http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1988/october/documents/
hf_jp-ii_spe_19881011_european-parliament.html; POPE JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC
EXHORTATION: ECCLESIA IN EUROPA para. 12 (2003) [hereinafter POPE JOHN PAUL II, ECCLESIA
IN
EUROPA],
http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_exhortations/
documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_20030628_ecclesia-in-europa.html.
88. Pope John Paul II, Address to European Parliament, supra note 87.
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both the current status and the future of Europe, he further distilled
his prophesy:
We joyfully recognize the growing openness of peoples to one
another, the reconciliation between countries which have been
hostile and at enmity with each other for a long time, the
progressive opening up to the countries of Eastern Europe in the
process of seeking deeper unity. Mutual recognition, forms of
cooperation and exchanges of all sorts are being developed in such a
way that little by little, a culture, indeed a European consciousness,
is being created. This we hope will encourage, especially among
the young, a sense of fraternity and the will to share. We note as a
very positive factor that the whole of this process is developing
according to democratic procedures, in a peaceful way and in the
spirit of freedom which respects and fosters legitimate diversity,
encouraging and sustaining the process leading to the growing
unity of Europe. We welcome with satisfaction all that has been
done to safeguard the conditions and ways to respect human
rights. Finally, in the context of the legitimate economic and
political unity in Europe, while acknowledging the signs of hope
seen by the attention given to the rights and to the quality of life, we
sincerely hope that, in creative fidelity to the humanist and
Christian traditions of our continent, there will be a guarantee of
the primacy of ethical and spiritual values.89

Over the years, a so-called neo-functionalist approach seems to
have frustrated these papal expectations and built the Union’s
image as a technocratic, elitist, and cosmopolitan framework that
remains distant from the people’s needs and even threatens their
particular cultures. While state governments have remained in
control of the European Communities’ and later of the European
Union’s institutions, a European polity has never really surfaced.90
The European Communities’ and the European Union’s main focus
has remained the economy and its globalization, while topics of
higher moral or political salience, on which Europeans divide
themselves culturally or geographically, have been avoided or
tackled from an economic angle.91 The same transformation of the
European Union from an international law into a constitutional law

89. POPE JOHN PAUL II, ECCLESIA IN EUROPA, supra note 87 (emphasis in the original).
90. Daniel Innerarity, Does Europe Need a Demos to Be Truly Democratic? 1–2 (London
Sch. Econ. “Europe in Question” Series (LEQS), Paper No. 77/2014, 2014).
91. Andrea Pin & John Witte, Jr., Meet the New Boss of Religious Freedom: The New Cases
of the Court of Justice of the European Union, 55 TEX. INT’L L. REV. 223, 230 (2020).
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framework took place in a sort of sleight of hand, which avoided
dealing with the various polities that still make up Europe: after
two domestic referenda aborted the project for a European Union’s
Constitution, the same text that had been rejected later entered into
force as a “Treaty.”92 It is quite understandable, then, that the
European Union has garnered the reputation of being a
technocratic, elitist, and cosmopolitan framework that remains
distant from people’s cultures and needs.
One episode epitomizes how dramatically the European Union
alienated Catholic support before 2012, when the global crisis hit
Europe the hardest, by espousing the cosmopolitanism ideal at the
expense of particularism. While drafting the Constitutional text, the
Union’s institutions refused the widespread invitations—including
those from then-Pope John Paul II93 who had done so much for the
freedom of the Union’s Eastern State members—to include any
reference to Christianity within the preamble under the assumption
that citing a religious tradition would have made the text partisan.
To many, such refusal symbolized the end of the longstanding
connection between the Catholic Church and the Union. The panContinental institution that so many Catholics had worked for was
turning against its origin and even fighting Christianity.94 Or, to use
religious terms, “Europe could unite and gain the whole world, but
[was losing] its soul.”95
Because of those developments, many Catholics now suspect
that the cosmopolitan drift of both liberalism and universalism
deprives a country of its culture and ideals for the sake of the
individual’s self-realization. Yet they increasingly also perceive
migration as a demographic partner, especially in countries such as
Italy, Hungary, or Poland, which have a long story of emigration

92. Adam Kreidman, Correcting Past Mistakes: The Failure of the European Constitution
and Its Resurrection as the Lisbon Treaty, 5 MIAMI-FLORIDA EUR. CTR. EXCELLENCE (May 2008).
93. Jason Horowitz, Europe, Seeking Political Unity, Stumbles Over Issue of Religion, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 7, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/07/world/europe/europeseeking-political-unity-stumbles-over-issue-of-religion.html.
94. Matthew Cantirino, Is The European Union A Catholic Plot?, FIRST THINGS (Jan. 18,
2012),
https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2012/01/is-the-european-union-acatholic-plot (“EU bureaucrats have become justly notorious for their hostility towards
religion, and especially Christianity, in the public square.”).
95. Brent F. Nelsen, European Integration and the Catholic and Protestant Churches 13
(Am.
Pol.
Sci.
Ass’n,
Annual
Meeting
Paper,
2013)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2300620.
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rather than immigration.96 Populists accuse immigration of political
and legal developments that resonate with Catholic concerns for
localism: immigrants might dilute a country’s cultural specificities,
disrupt its economic and societal makeup, and push institutions to
change their laws to accommodate newcomers.97 Although
Catholic sensitivity to the needs of migrants that seek a decent life
or barely to survive through embarking on inhumane travels,
populist forces have thus gained teeth within Catholic circles due
to their resistance to immigration.
By emphasizing the necessity of preserving a country’s heritage
and identity against massive inflows of migrants, populists
advocate for the need of what they call the forgotten people and pit
their own agenda against the “transnational monster of liberalism
and multiculturalism.”98 They develop anti-elitist and anticosmopolitan narratives that aim to protect local traditions from
supranational institutions as well as from newcomers. Within the
hands of populists, localism morphs into an identitarian narrative
that advocates the preservation of national collectivities from the
arrival of newcomers through an overtly religious rhetoric.
Aiming to restore the link between the individual and the polity
through identitarian narratives, populist parties and governments
have magnified the historical role of Christianity within their
language and legal texts. Once again, the Hungarian constitutional
trajectory exemplifies this trend: the Hungarian Constitutional
Preamble makes explicit reference to Christianity, and the leading

96. See MERCATOR FORUM MIGRATION & DEMOCRACY (MIDEM), ANNUAL REPORT ON
MIGRATION AND POPULISM 5 (2018) [hereinafter MIDEM], https://forummidem.de/cms/data/fm/download/TUD_MIDEM_Jahresbericht2018_Excerpt_FINAL.pd
f (“Culturally grounded arguments for the rejection of migration are particularly
pronounced in countries with a low share of foreigners . . . [where] the fear of losing identity
and social cohesion promotes opposition to migration.”). According to Michał Kowalski,
Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries have not been directly affected by
the Mediterranean refugee crisis. Michal Kowalski, From a Different Angle—Poland and the
Mediterranean Refugee Crisis, 17 GERMAN L.J., 967, 968, 970 (2016). This, Kowalski writes,
“might explain Poland’s most skeptical approach towards the European Commission’s
proposals aimed at burden sharing among the Member States based on the relocation of
refugees.” Id. at 968.
97. MIDEM, supra note 96, at 15 (“Parties like PiS in Poland or Fidesz in Hungary were
successful in describing European ‘refugee quotas’ as a threat to national sovereignty . . .
[and] claim[ing] the[ir] role of protectors.”).
98. This expression was used by Orban to define the European Union. See Joseph
Ewing, Viktor Orban, in THE MIGHTY AND THE ALMIGHTY: HOW POLITICAL LEADERS DO GOD
loc. 2318 (Nick Spencer ed., 2017) (ebook).
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party, Fidesz, now poses as the defender of European culture.99 In
Italy, Matteo Salvini, the leader of the Lega party, consistently uses
religious symbols and claims in his political rallies.100 Disgruntled
Italian Catholics easily identify with his narrative because it depicts
the European Union as an engine of liberal, cosmopolitan, and
secularist ideas, as well as a promoter of global migration,
against which they think they should react in the name of their
identity and for the sake of their survival.101 Populists’ logic thus
conflates Christianity with tradition and religion with ethnicity,
but it is certainly appealing to those who feel that localism has
been neglected.
Despite their claim to restore a Christian Europe, however,
national populists do not always support the comeback of Christian
rituals or practices. They rather endorse visions of “secularized
Christianity-as-culture” or of a “civilizational and identitarian
Christianism.”102 They make religious narratives and symbols into
identitarian tools, promoting religion as a matter of belonging
rather than believing.103
Such an identitarian approach is problematic in two ways for
Catholicism. First, the separation of belonging from believing
clashes with Catholic social thinking. As Professor Oliver Roy has
noted, “[a]lthough the [Catholic] Church does not reject the concept
of the ‘Christian identity’ of Europe, it has stressed, since Pope John
Paul II, that this identity should go along with faith and Christian
values and norms.”104 Second, the insistence on the political role of
tradition that is so widespread among European populists is not
quintessentially Catholic. European populists leverage their
99. Religious tradition is explicitly rooted in the Preamble of the Hungarian
Constitution (2011), which proudly celebrates King Saint Stephen as the builder of the
Hungarian State as “a part of Christian Europe one thousand years ago.” See Andras Bozóki
& Zoltan Ádám, State and Faith: Right-wing Populism and Nationalized Religion in Hungary, 2 E.
EUR. J. SOC’Y & POL. 98, 100–22 (2016).
100. Roy, supra note 80 (describing Salvini’s “constant exhibition of Catholic symbols
(crucifix, rosary, invocation of Virgin Mary)”).
101. Willfred Spohn, Europeanization, Religion and Collective Identities in an Enlarging
Europe, 12 EUR. J. SOC. THEORY 358, 358–60 (2009).
102. Rogers Brubaker, Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European Populist
Moment in Comparative Perspective, 40 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1191, 1199 (2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
103. See generally Olivier Roy, Beyond Populism: The Conservative Right, the Courts, the
Churches and the Concept of a Christian Europe, in SAVING THE PEOPLE: HOW POPULISTS HIJACK
RELIGION 185, 185–201 (Nadia Marzouki, Duncan McDonnell & Olivier Roy eds., 2016).
104. Roy, supra note 80.
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countries’ Catholic ancestry, rather than the Catholic traditional
philosophical style of reasoning. While it is true that prominent
Catholic philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre value the
importance of tradition for moral inquiry,105 Catholic social
thinking has constantly maintained that the liberties and legal
values it cherishes are rooted in the nature of human beings,106 not
simply in Christian revelation or tradition.107
The mismatch between the support gained by populists
through their identitarian and traditionalist narrative and the
Catholic distinctive interest in natural law probably further reflects
deep rifts within contemporary Catholic culture. As a matter of fact,
although the Catholic world abounds with legal philosophers
arguing on the basis of natural law theories, the mobilization of
Catholics against liberalism, cosmopolitanism, the European
Union, or the lingua franca of rights has found its preferential
language in tradition instead of natural law. To some extent,
the success of populist narratives and their tradition-based
language show that natural law language, albeit well-rooted
within Catholic philosophy, does not hold much sway among
the Catholic multitudes.
III. LEGAL INTERPRETATION AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS:
THE ATTACKS ON THE JUDICIARY
Many of the worrisome reforms that populist governments
have introduced lately focus on the judiciary. Recently, Polish and
Hungarian laws have targeted judicial independence, rulings, and
powers to review legislation, thereby triggering deep
controversy.108 It is safe to say that, within populist ranks, the ideal
of democratic legitimization has obscured the importance of the
rule of law more than once.109 Once in charge, populist parties may
105. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 7 (1988).
106. NIEBUHR, supra note 22, at 135.
107. DOE, supra note 17, at 382 (emphasizing that Catholic canon law still gives a special
place to natural law).
108. See, e.g., Wojciech Sadurski & Maximilian Steinbeis, What Is Going on in Poland Is
an
Attack
Against
Democracy,
VERFASSUNGSBLOG
(July
15,
2016),
https://verfassungsblog.de/what-is-going-on-in-poland-is-an-attack-against-democracy/;
Gábor Halmai, Dismantling Constitutional Review in Hungary, 1/2019 RIVISTA DI DIRITTI
COMPARATI 31, 31–47 (2019).
109. See Renata Uitz, The Return of the Sovereign: A Look at the Rule of Law in Hungary—
and in Europe, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Apr. 5, 2017), https://verfassungsblog.de/the-return-ofthe-sovereign-a-look-at-the-rule-of-law-in-hungary-and-in-europe/.
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shake the foundations of a constitutional system by implementing
reforms that threaten the separation of powers.
Like with democracy and fundamental rights, the Catholic
viewpoint on the separation of powers doctrine has dramatically
shifted over time. As is well-known, this theory was originally
rejected by the Catholic Church because it was seen as a threat to
the indivisible and divine nature of authority.110 Throughout the
twentieth century, however, Catholicism has slowly softened its
position, eventually coming to embrace the separation of powers as
an important pillar for the organization of society. In particular,
Pope John Paul II celebrated the separation of powers while
demonizing the “absolute power” of Marxist-Leninist
totalitarianism.111 His Encyclical Letter Centesimus Annus stated
that “a sound theory of the State” should embrace the “rule of law”
and envision a legal order within which “each power [is] balanced
by other powers and by other spheres of responsibility which keep
it within proper bounds.”112 Once again, while the fight against
communism supported the alliance between Catholicism and
liberalism, praise for the separation of powers enshrined in the
Encyclical seemed to confirm that a wedding had taken place
between Catholicism and liberal constitutionalism. Similar to what
happened to human rights and liberalism, many hopes were
misplaced also in respect to the separation of powers. In fact, the
clash between liberalism and Catholic legal and political culture
has also involved the judicial sphere.
In the late twentieth century, various strands of liberalism
entrusted and empowered the judiciary with the role of solving
“some of the most pertinent and polemical political controversies a

110. See, e.g., POPE LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER: IMMORTALE DEI para. 18 (1885),
http://www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_
01111885_immortale-dei.html (“[T]he ruling powers are invested with a sacredness more
than human, and are withheld from deviating from the path of duty, and from overstepping
the bounds of rightful authority . . . .”).
111. POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 15, para. 44.
112. Id. (“[O]ne passage of Rerum Novarum . . . presents the organization of society
according to the three powers—legislative, executive and judicial—, something which at the
time represented a novelty in Church teaching. Such an ordering reflects a realistic vision of
man’s social nature, which calls for legislation capable of protecting the freedom of all. To
that end, it is preferable that each power be balanced by other powers and by other spheres
of responsibility which keep it within proper bounds. This is the principle of the ‘rule of law’,
in which the law is sovereign, and not the arbitrary will of individuals.”) (footnote omitted).
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democratic polity can contemplate.”113 Judges thus left their role of
“mouth of the law” to take up that of making justice case-by-case.114
Additionally, in civil law jurisdictions they took on the role of
making the law evolve on their shoulders.115 In Europe, courts
became the defenders of democracy and human rights because of
their capacity to connect the domestic legal order with the panEuropean one in practical ways, even circumventing the political
process.116 In the 1990s to early 2000s, the idea of “judicial dialogue”
stimulated and reinforced judicial activism by fostering the practice
of borrowing and lending legal ideas across domestic and
supranational jurisdictions.117
Some have found that such an empowerment of the judiciary
takes place at the expense of legislative powers and the political
process,118 and transforms the angle from which formidable societal
issues are tackled. Judicial narratives are capable of flattening
“questions of meaning, identity, and purpose into questions of

113. Ran Hirschl, The New Constitution and the Judicialization of Pure Politics Worldwide,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 722 (2006).
114. For a discussion on the relationship between judicial activism and the separation
of powers doctrine, see Luca Pietro Vanoni, New Challenges to the Separation of Powers: The
Role of Constitutional Courts, in NEW CHALLENGES TO THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: DIVIDING
POWER 46, 46–77 (Antonia Baraggia, Cristina Fasone & Luca Pietro Vanoni eds., 2020).
115. In the words of the former Italian Constitutional Court President Paolo Grossi,
[y]esterday, in the modern era, a judge’s job was to adapt the fact to the legal rule
(legal rules were designed as major premises of a logic-deductive syllogism).
Today, in the post-modern legal era, the judge has to understand the facts behind
the case-law through a uniquely evaluative process and adapt the legal rule to this
fact of life, looking for the more adjust solution. The judge’s job is therefore
materializing into a process of invention [which in Latin designs the act of
“finding”] that is opposite to a syllogism because it involves not only the logic and
rational abilities of the judges, but especially his axiologic abilities such as
intuition, perception, comprehension.
Paolo Grossi, La invenzione del diritto: a proposito della funzione dei giudici (Luca P. Vanoni
trans.,
2017),
https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/interventi_presidente/
Grossi_Scandicci.pdf.
116. ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN
EUROPE 193 (2002) (“In today’s multi-tiered European polity, the sovereignty of the
legislature, and the primacy of national executives, are dead. In concert or in rivalry,
European legislators govern with judges.”).
117. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L.
REV. 99, 99–137 (1994).
118. Manent, supra note 84 (“The democratic system which rested on a certain
equilibrium between executive power and legislative power tends to be substituted by a
system which is dominated by a scattered and diffused judicial power which derives its
legitimacy from itself.”).
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equality and fairness.”119 They deal with cultural, ideological, and
political issues from the point of view of statutes and judicial
precedent.120 These phenomena clash with the Catholic sensitivity
for moral questions and its insistence that political bodies should
have a say in them.121
Such an individualistic, rights-based narrative that has
prevailed within the judicial realm has served the Polish and
Hungarian attacks on domestic courts’ powers and independence.
The empowerment of the judiciary provided populist parties with
the perfect enemy to fight.122 As populists fight cosmopolitanism
and individualism, they can easily target judges as domestic
hotspots of such ideals. The attack on the judiciary in Poland, which
some have seen as part of “a comprehensive and largely successful
assault on its fundamental constitutional institutions by the
victorious party,” Prawo i Sprawiedliwość,123 exemplifies this
phenomenon. Until recently, the Polish judiciary had the
reputation of being one of the most activist judicial branches of
Western democracies. Some even found that such activism had led
to an “imbalance between powers.”124 Such charges have lately
provided a cheap justification for the national reforms that have
undercut judicial independence.
In Poland, such reforms have forced Catholic public figures and
institutions to take sides, shaking the unity of the Church. At the
beginning of the populist regime in 2015 and 2016, many bishops’
silence was interpreted as a sign of tacit support. The controversial,
Catholic conservative and very popular Radio Maryja, however,
started broadcasting nationalistic programs criticizing the

119. Michael Sandel, Populism, Trump, and the Future of Democracy, OPENDEMOCRACY
(May 9, 2018), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/populism-trump-and-future-ofdemocracy/.
120. See Pin, supra note 40, at 242.
121. DENEEN, supra note 8, at 31 (stating that liberalism fosters anthropological individualism).
122. See Luca Pietro Vanoni & Benedetta Vimercati, Dall’identità alle identity politics: la
rinascita dei nazionalismi nel sistema costituzionale europeo, 1 QUADERNI CONSTITUZIONALI 39
(2020) (arguing that the increasingly political role of litigation triggered populist reactions in
Poland in Hungary as well as elsewhere in Europe).
123. Wojciech Sadurski, Constitutional Design: Lessons from Poland’s Democratic
Backsliding, 6 CONST. STUD. 59, 60 (2020).
124. See IUSTITIA POLUSKA, RESPONSE TO THE WHITE PAPER COMPENDIUM ON THE
REFORMS OF THE POLISH JUSTICE SYSTEM, PRESENTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
POLAND TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Mar. 2018), https://www.statewatch.org/news/
2018/mar/pl-judges-association-response-judiciary-reform-3-18.pdf.
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European liberal order.125 When the President Andrzej Duda
vetoed bills aiming to reform the judiciary system in 2017,
Archbishop Stanisław Gądecki “congratulated the turn of the
President . . . with a letter in which he outlined the principle of
separation of powers in conformity with the Catholic Social
Doctrine.”126 Once again, post-modern rifts penetrated Catholic
culture and trapped it in a political and ideological battle.
CONCLUSION
Post-modern ideals have reshaped the intellectual frameworks
of constitutional and international law. Globalization,
supranationalism, and cosmopolitanism, which have marked the
passage from “solid” to “liquid” times,127 have become powerful
hermeneutical tools, affecting legal and political thinking.
However, they have also sparked much controversy, triggering
deep polarization within contemporary societies. Catholicism has
been no exception. Challenged by new legal narratives and global
phenomena, such as the 2008 economic crisis or massive migration,
Catholics have not responded with one voice. Struggles between
those who have heeded cosmopolitanism’s call on one side, and the
supporters of populism and sovereignism on the other side, have
mobilized the equilibrium sought by Catholicism between
universalism and particularism, threatening the historical alliance
between Catholicism and liberalism and questioning Catholic
support for human rights. In short, the polarization of the post-

125. Radio Maryja is a radio station founded in Toruń, Poland, on December 9, 1991, by
Father Tadeusz Rydzyk. It endorses a social-conservative vision of the Catholic faith and
presents itself as “‘the Catholic voice at your home.’” Alfred M. Wierzbicki, Present Condition
and Role of the Catholic Church in Poland, 38 OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN E. EUR. 99
(2018), https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol38/iss5/6. According to José Pedro
Zúquete, Radio Maryja constitutes a clear example of the “politicization of religious
discourse” that morphs into “religious populism” because this radio station “promotes, and
is the epitome of, a certain version of Polish Catholicism as an ‘ideology of struggle.’” José
Pedro Zúquete, Populism and Religion, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM 447 (Cristóbal
Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo & Pierre Ostiguy eds. 2017).
126. Wierzbicki, supra note 125, at 98. Catholic doctrine has highlighted the importance
of independence of the judiciary. See, e.g., POPE JOHN XXIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER: PACEM IN
TERRIS para. 69 (1963), http://www.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/en/encyclicals/
documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem.html (“[J]ustice must be administered
impartially, and judges must be wholly incorrupt and uninfluenced by the solicitations of
interested parties.”).
127. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, LIQUID TIMES: LIVING IN THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 3 (2007).
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modern age has spilled into the Catholic world, disrupting its unity
and creating new gaps between Catholics.
The rifts within the Catholic Church thus largely reflect the
variety of post-modern understandings of liberalism. When
liberalism championed the values of the rule of law, human rights,
and democracy, Catholicism happily embraced it. When it
sought to monopolize the public philosophy and force other
political cultures outside the list of marketable ideas, Catholic
voices disagreed. Hollowing out spirituality, drying out local
cultures, and putting cultures in a straitjacket was not an option
for Catholicism.
Recent developments in liberalism have fueled the populist
backlash. Through their rhetoric, populist parties magnify the
traditional roots and religious identity of Western democracies,
aiming to muster Catholic support. A closer look reveals, however,
that the populist agenda does not fit comfortably within some of
the basic tenets of Catholic culture. It downplays the duty of
solidarity that is deeply rooted in Catholic teachings, while its
ethnocentrism and nationalism overlook Catholic universalism.128
Populism may have surfaced to counter the diseases of
post-modern liberalism, but it has subsequently become part of
the sickness.
Since the end of World War II, the alliance between Catholicism
and liberalism has nurtured a sense of respect for the dignity of
human beings and fostered the development of a robust
constitutional culture. Catholicism as a whole has not abandoned
liberalism because it does not endorse such ideals anymore; on the
contrary, it has rather distanced itself from liberalism because it
does not perceive it as compatible with key ideals such as localism
or transcendence, or solidarity with the poor. Those who are
sympathetic with populist stances therefore often value aspects of
Catholicism that may fail to shine within contemporary liberalism.
Some years ago, writing about multiculturalism, the Catholic
theologian Javier Prades identified some aspects of modernity that,
in his view, would prove to be significant challenges. He noted the
contemporary emphasis on technocracy and the replacement of
128. See JOHN PAUL II, MEMORIA E IDENTITÀ, supra note 56, at 86 (“Caratteristica del
nazionalismo . . . è di riconoscere e perseguire soltanto il bene della propria nazione, senza
tener conto dei diritti delle altre. Il patriottismo, invece, in quanto amore per la patria,
riconosce a tutte le altre nazioni diritti uguali a quelli rivendicati per la propria ed è perciò
la via per un ordinato amore sociale.”).
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narratives focused on goals with those focused on means,129 the
extent to which universality is often opposed to particularity,130 and
the difficulties in reconciling tradition with modernity.131 This
Article has illustrated that similar difficulties are now
characterizing the debate between populism and liberalism. After
his diagnosis, Prades suggested that cultural differences need not
be cured, but better understood as mutually provocative, urging
society at large to consider them seriously and attentively.132
Prades’s suggestion holds true within the struggle between
liberalism and populism: a lively culture can heed both the calls
surfacing within liberalism and populism, without blessing either
with the chrism of sacredness while rejecting the other. These
disagreements need not drive Catholics apart: rather than fight,
Catholic proponents of liberalism and populism can embrace a
mutually enlightening open dialogue and talk.133

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

JAVIER PRADES, OCCIDENTE: L’INELUDIBILE INCONTRO 19 (2008).
Id. at 28.
Id. at 32–33, 123.
Id. at 7.
See John Witte, Jr., To Serve Right and to Fight Wrong, in POPE BENEDICT XVI’S LEGAL
THOUGHT 119 (Marta Cartabia & Andrea Simoncini eds., 2015) (suggesting that what modern
societies mostly need is a “collective discourse of competing understandings . . . of the divine
and the human, of good and evil, of individuality and community”).
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